How does Political Violence Affect Currency Substitution? Evidence from Egypt by David Fielding & Anja Shortland
How does Political Violence 
Affect Currency Substitution? 
Evidence from Egypt
David Fielding* and Anja Shortland§
Abstract
In this paper we estimate a time-series model of the financial asset portfolio 
shares in Egypt, distinguishing between assets of varying degrees of liquidity and 
between domestic currency and foreign currency deposits. While financial
liberalization and financial stability are found to have encouraged domestic
residents to increase the share of their portfolio composed of domestic currency
assets, these effects have been offset by an increase in the number of violent
political incidents arising from conflict between radical Islamic groups and the 
Egyptian state. Greater violence has led to lower domestic asset demand and 
substitution into foreign currency deposits. The link between political events and 
financial outcomes provides a rationale for economic policy interventions by
Bretton Woods institutions in response to increases in political instability. 
JEL Classification: E41, F31, O16
Keywords: Egypt; Currency Substitution; Asset Demand; Political Violence;
Radical Islamism
* University of Leicester and Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
Address for correspondence: Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Leicester LE1 
7RH, England. Telephone +44-116-252-3909. E-mail DJF14@LE.AC.UK.
§ University of Leicester.1
1. Introduction
Early in the 1990s the Egyptian government instituted a reform program that was
largely successful by many conventional criteria. Domestic capital markets were
successfully liberalized, and financially repressive controls on interest rates were
removed. The foreign exchange rate black market premium, which had been growing 
steadily over the 1980s, was eliminated by a sequence of official exchange rate
devaluations. However, these reforms had surprisingly little influence on many
monetary and financial aggregates. For example, before the start of the reform program, 
at the end of 1985, the fraction of private sector deposits in Egyptian banks made up by 
domestic currency accounts was 68%. Ten years later, after the reform program had 
ended, the figure had risen only to 70%. 1 The private sector continued to hedge its bets 
about the viability of the post-reform exchange rate peg and low level of inflation: 30% of 
deposits were held in foreign currency accounts.
One possible explanation for the lack of confidence is that the reforms lacked 
credibility; but this is difficult to maintain when the program was successful by so many 
conventional criteria. I n this paper we pursue an alternative explanation: that the 
economic reforms would have increased confidence in the local economy and currency, 
were it not for the worsening of political conditions in Egypt, as manifested by a rise in 
the level of politically motivated violence, mostly on the part of radical Islamist groups.2
Our hypothesis is that in terms of the economic consequences of Egyptian government 
policy in the 1990s, a failure to prevent a rise in political instability offset the success in 
increasing economic stability. The vehicle for testing this hypothesis will be a time-series
econometric analysis of the determinants of currency substitution, that is, substitution 
between domestic currency and foreign currency assets.
Our main aim in this paper is to estimate econometrically the extent to which 
political violence impacts on Egyptian investors’ decisions about whether to hold
domestic currency assets or foreign currency assets, and to compare the magnitude of 
any such effects with those of “standard” economic factors, such as the rate of exchange 
rate depreciation or the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. The 
1 These figures are based on the data discussed in Section 3. One way in which the Egyptian 
financial system has been relatively liberal, even as early as the 1970s, has been in the absence of 
any restrictions on the creation of foreign currency accounts by Egyptian banks. This means that 
at least Egyptians can hold their foreign currency savings in the formal financial sector, instead 
of accumulating illicit foreign bank notes. To a certain extent this mitigates the financial 
problems that arise when the domestic currency is weak, though foreign currency deposits do not 
necessarily promote the sustainability of a fixed official exchange rate peg like Egypt’s (Mizen 
1999).
2 Political instability indicators have been found to impact on investment and financial markets 
in a small number of other LDCs, including South Africa. See Fedderke (2000), Fedderke and Liu 
(1999) and Fielding (2002).2
focus on currency substitution is of interest in itself. If an economic reform program, 
such as the Egyptian reform of the early 1990s, is to be at all successful then it must 
generate confidence not only in the local financial system, but also in the local currency. 
The existence of a large quantity of foreign currency deposits held by agents whose 
expenditure is mostly in local currency indicates a lack of confidence in this currency. 
This lack of confidence erodes the government’s seigniorage tax base, increasing the 
potential for fiscal crises and hyperinflationary episodes.
But the analysis of the determinants of currency substitution is also of interest 
because of its wider implications. The relative abundance of financial data in a country 
like Egypt permits an econometric analysis of the factors influencing the evolution of 
financial aggregates. Real economic variables – such as physical investment and GDP 
growth – are no less important; but these variables are more problematic in terms of 
econometric analysis because complete national accounts statistics are available for a 
relatively short period of time, and then only annually. Nevertheless, if a factor such as 
the intensity of political violence has a significant impact on the financial sector, this 
suggests that it is more likely than not that the real sector is affected also. Then political 
violence is not “just” a political problem but also an economic one, and should be a factor 
taken into account in economic planning and policy formation by national and
international authorities.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. In Section 2 we review t he
political economy of radical Islamism in Egypt. The main purpose of this section is to 
show that although the total number of fatalities in politically motivated violent
incidents is not in itself very high (compared with full-scale civil war), the political and 
economic consequences of such violence are far wider than their impact on the
individuals and communities on whom they impact directly. Section 3 then reviews the 
financial and economic data that is used in the econometric analysis in Section 4. The
summary in Section 5 suggests some possible policy implications of these results.
2. Radical Islamism and the political economy of Egypt
Currency substitution reflects Egyptian savers’ expectations that the official exchange rate 
would depreciate. Therefore higher returns were expected on US$ holdings than on local 
currency, despite the lower interest rate on foreign currency deposits. An earlier study of 
currency substitution in Egypt (El-Erian, 1988) showed that residents’ demand for foreign 
currency was sensitive to inflationary pressures and weak external balances. A dummy 
variable for “political disruption” after the assassination of president Sadat3 indicated that 
3  Thi s event  fall s out side  t he  sam ple  peri od  of  our  ow n  regression  equat i ons.3
political factors also mattered for residents’ confidence in the Egyptian pound. The
following section proposes a causal link between Islamist violence and confidence in the 
pound. The effect of political violence on currency substitution is then examined using an 
index of Islamic fundamentalist attacks. 
2.1 Explaining currency devaluations
The “escape clause” literature (following Obstfeld, 1994) explains that self-fulfilling
currency crises may emerge because a government’s commitment to an exchange rate 
peg depends on a political cost-benefit analysis4. The cost of maintaining a peg under a 
speculative attack is weighed against the benefits from maintaining the peg. If the 
economy is destabilised by high interest rates and / or political time horizons are short 
and long run benefits are heavily discounted, the peg is abandoned5. In developing
countries, however, the main conflict may be between maintaining a fixed exchange rate 
and the government’s need for seigniorage finance6. What is common to all the models is 
that speculators do not know the government’s objective function and therefore have to 
guess how the government will react to changes in economic and political conditions.
The escape clause literature also assumes that there is a unified, pegged
exchange rate at which all transactions take place. If there is a multiple exchange rate 
system, however, speculative pressure can to some extent be absorbed by a depreciation 
of the parallel market exchange rate. So the timing of the depreciation of the official 
exchange rate becomes even more indeterminate, as investors have to guess the size of 
the black market premium that will be tolerated by the government. Egypt managed its 
foreign exchange transactions through a multiple exchange rate arrangement
throughout the period of investigation 7. An official parallel market for foreign exchange
was established in 1973 and from 1975 the exchange rate in the parallel market
fluctuated independently from the official rate8. The combination of inflation and an 
official exchange rate peg resulted in a steady appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
through the 1980s the spread between the official and black market rate increased 
dramatically. So the lack of confidence in the domestic currency was initially reflected in 
the black market rate rather than the official exchange rate. In 1989, 1990 and 1991 the 
official exchange rate was realigned to reflect the black market rate of the Egyptian 
4 For example Drazen and Masson (1994), Bensaid and Jeane (1997), Jeanne and Masson (1999).
5 Bussiere and Mulder (1999), Leblang and Bernhard (1999).
6 Fielding and Mizen (2001).
7See the IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
8 Domac and Shabsigh (1999).4
pound9. Since then the authorities have intervened in the foreign exchange market to 
maintain the rate in a tight band against the US$10.
We conjecture that the Egyptian government was sensitive to increased spreads 
between the official and parallel exchange rate and to the size of its hard currency
reserves. Investors would have to guess whether the government would tolerate an
increase in the spread between the official and parallel exchange rates, intervene in the 
foreign exchange market using its US$ reserves, or adjust the official exchange rate11.
Risk averse savers therefore held some of their wealth in US$ deposits. Clearly savers 
should react to changes in Egypt’s economic performance. But why would savers be 
sensitive to political violence?
2.2 The effect of political violence on currency substitution
Political models of currency crises look at political factors that affect the time horizon of 
governments and therefore affect the trade-off between the short-term costs of defending 
a peg and the long-term gains of maintaining the peg. Political factors, which have been 
shown to be significant in explaining past crises, include elections (especially those
leading to the defeat of a right-of-centre government), cabinet dissolutions and coups12.
Most studies of the effects of political instability on confidence in a currency
would treat Egypt as politically very stable, though. There has been an extremely low
turnover of veto players and the time of office of the strong presidents was very long (11 
years for Mr Sadat and 16 years for Mr Mubarak by 1997). The governing party had a 
large and stable majority exceeding 70% of seats in the parliament throughout  the
period of examination, as potentially popular opposition parties were suppressed.
Moreover, the opposition was fragmented with independent candidates representing the 
largest part of the seats not held by the government since 1990. This made meaningful
political opposition a remote possibility. According to the Beck database of political
institutions there was only one period of political instability since 1980: in 1981
President Sadat was assassinated. He was replaced by a political ally, who has been in
office ever since. Currency substitution is therefore unlikely to be driven by changes in 
the government’s time horizon. Political violence did not create expectations of a change 
in the government and hence fear of a policy U-turn.
9 From February 1991 a unified exchange rate replaced all other existing exchange rates. 
10 Handy (1998).
11 A further way of managing exchange rate pressure was through quantitative import
restrictions and high tariffs. (Handy 1998).
12 For example Eichengreen et al  (1995), Bussiere and Mulder (1999), Leblang and Bernhard 
(1999).5
There are, however, two possible causal mechanisms by why an increase in
political violence could be reflected in increased currency substitution. Firstly the
government reacted to political violence by strengthening anti-terrorist legislation,
which was then used to crack  down on suspected Islamist activists. Estimates of the 
numbers detained fluctuate between the authorities’ estimate of 10,000 and the Islamist 
opposition’s claim of 30,000 detainees13. There has also been an increased cost of
protecting politicians and state institutions. A large contingent of tourist police has been 
deployed to guard tourist sites. The increase in political violence is therefore reflected in 
increased fiscal expenditure. This meant that there was an increased incentive to raise 
revenues through the inflation tax and thereby endanger the peg.
Secondly, political violence deterred tourists and hence weakened external
balances and foreign exchange reserves. The probability that the government would use 
its foreign exchange reserves to intervene in the parallel market would be affected by a 
downturn in tourist revenues. Falling reserves would increase the incentive for holding 
hard currency rather than Egyptian pounds. Evidence for the effect of violence on tourist 
revenues and the reserve position are presented in Appendix 1. It shows that tourism 
was affected by violence, whether or not this violence was specifically targeted at
tourists. The development of Islamist strategies is discussed in the following section.
2.3 Islamist violence in Egypt
The strategy of the militant Islamist organisations fluctuated during the period of
observation, in terms of the frequency of attacks, their targets and military tactics.14
Islamist movements were banned from Egyptian politics in 1954 and went underground
in response to government repression. During the 1970s, however, there was a general 
Islamist revival, spread through mosques, youth clubs and cultural and welfare
organisations. There were two main Islamist movements: al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the 
Muslim brotherhood), which was non-violent and Al-Jama’a al Islamiya, which had no 
political programme but a preference for direct action. There were also two small radical 
groups (plus a few unimportant tiny radical groups): Jama’at al’Muslimun (a splinter 
group from the Ikhwan movement) and Shabab Muhammad. Between 1972 and 1979 
there were 26 incidents of Islamist violence, which were mainly directed against the 
Christian minority, the Copts.
Political violence increased in the 1980s as Islamists opposed the government’s
rapprochement with Israel and its pro-Western stance. The radical wing of the Ikhwan
movement gained prominence in the otherwise non-violent movement and Upper Egypt’s 
13 Le Monde Diplomatique January 1998: “Egypt’s Islamists caught in a bind”.
14 See Hafez 2000.6
Jama’a movement joined forces with the radical  al-Jihad organisation. The violent
incidents in this period were increasingly directed against the state rather than the 
Copts. The violence culminated in the assassination of President Sadat in October 1981 
and the insurrection of radical Islamists in Asyut. The states’ brutal repression in
response to these events succeeded in lowering the number of violent incidents from 
1982 to 1985. 
From 1984 the Ikhwan movement became a player in Egyptian politics being 
tolerated as a religious group and cooperating with the Wafd party to gain
parliamentary representation. Ikhwan therefore became committed to pluralism,
gradualism and non-violence. Violent acts were mainly committed by Jama’a in Upper 
Egypt and mostly targeted at musical festivals, beer deliveries, cinemas and individuals 
engaged in “vice”. The secular government responded to these incidents with mass
arrests and the storming of  Jama’a mosques. The violent repression turned public 
opinion against the government. 
From late 1989 Jama’a started to target prominent officials for assassinations. In 
December 1989 an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate the interior minister 
Zaki Baldr and in 1990 the former speaker of parliament Rafat al-Mahjoub was
assassinated. From 1992 a vicious circle of incidents of violence and counter-violence
began. Through 1992 and 1993 there were almost daily incidents of violence, mainly the 
work of Jama’a with  al’Jihad playing a minor role. Jama’a formed an official armed 
wing using high-tech explosives and military intelligence, which attacked policemen,
security forces and prominent government officials. There were also attacks on banks 
and foreign exchange bureaus. The government reacted by suppressing the  Ikhwan
movement politically and arrested those Ikhwan members most likely to stand for the 
1995 parliamentary election. In response the Islamists started a series of direct attacks 
on tourists and issued communiqués for Western tourists to stay away from Egypt.
Examples of such attacks are the massacres of Greek tourists outside their Cairo hotel in 
April 1996, German tourists in front of the Cairo Museum in September 1997 and the 
killing of 60 tourists in Luxor in November 1997. 
2.4 Summary 
Islamist violence in Egypt was initially based on religious tension between Muslims and 
Christians, and the desire of some Islamists to impose Sharia laws. However, the
political stance of the government towards Israel and its repression of Islamist
fundamentalists meant that Islamist violence was increasingly directed against the 
state. Radical Islamist groups employed a variety of strategies, designed to harm the 
government directly through assassination attempts or indirectly through undermining 7
tourism, which provided much of the government’s revenues and hard currency income. 
Violence therefore meant that state resources would be tied up in military and security 
expenditure and that the foreign exchange operations of the Bank of Egypt would be 
constrained by low foreign exchange reserves. This would make a devaluation more 
likely at any given level of the black market foreign exchange premium. At any one point 
in time, the black market premium might be close to the level that triggered a monetary 
authority intervention. With low foreign exchange reserves, that intervention is more 
likely to be a devaluation than a repurchase of Egyptian pounds. Savers were therefore 
sensitive to changes in political violence and held some of their wealth in hard currency, 
to avoid being caught out by a devaluation.
In the absence of reliable quarterly data on tourism receipts and security
expenditures, it will not be possible to estimate a structural model that traces the causal 
chain from greater violence to lower tourism revenue and higher security expenditures 
to currency substitution. Nevertheless, we will attempt to estimate the overall impact of 
violence in reduced form, by including a measure of political violence directly in an asset 
demand function.
3. The evolution of monetary aggregates and political instability in Egypt
The key variables we will focus on in this paper are those measuring the ratio of foreign 
currency deposits to domestic currency deposits held by Egyptians, as reported in the 
Central Bank of Egypt Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Aside from the disaggregation by 
currency, deposits are disaggregated by depositor (business sector deposits and personal 
household sector deposits) and by the type of deposit (demand deposits and savings
deposits). Figures 1-2 depict the evolution of the quarterly real values of the deposit 
series over the 1980s and 1990s.15 With the three types of disaggregation there are eight 
series in total. The econometric analysis in the following section is designed to explain 
the following four ratios:
DB The ratio of business sector foreign currency demand deposits to business 
sector domestic currency demand deposits;
DP The ratio of household sector foreign currency demand deposits to
household sector domestic currency demand deposits; 
SB The ratio of business sector foreign currency savings deposits to business 
sector domestic currency savings deposits;
15 We use as a deflator the consumer price index reported in the IMF International Financial 
Statistics.8
SP The ratio of household sector foreign currency savings deposits to
household sector domestic currency savings deposits.
Four separate currency ratios are used because asset demand elasticities could principle 
vary between households  and businesses, and between demand deposits and savings 
deposits.
[Figures 1-2 here]
As Figures 1-2 illustrate, real values of all of the deposit series have illustrated a great 
deal of variability over time. Some of these variations appear to be linked to particular 
economic events. Certainly there is a substantial movement out of foreign currency
(predominantly US Dollars) and into domestic currency coinciding with the Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) of 1990-91. The program involved
extensive liberalization and privatization within the Egyptian financial system (El-
Refaie, 1998). Probably the most important element of the program from the point of 
view of currency substitution was Decree 117 of 1991, allowing free trade in foreign
currency and so legalizing the black market for Dollars. The program also instituted 
greater flexibility in interest rates charged on domestic currency deposits, and reformed 
the regulation of private capital markets (El-Din, 1998).
It remains to be seen whether the coincidence of financial reform and substitution 
into domestic currency assets reflects a causal relationship between asset demand and 
financial market conditions. Moreover, there are variations in the asset demand series 
that are not obviously related to financial reform. For example, business sector demand 
for foreign currency assets has risen steadily since 1994, despite a stable, market-
clearing official exchange rate and a declining rate of inflation. A robust model of
currency substitution must incorporate factors that explain these movements.
One candidate to explain the additional variations in asset demand is an
indicator of the level of political violence discussed in Section 2. Abul`ala (1998) and 
Hafez (2000) provide an annual time-varying indicator of the aggregate level of violence, 
measured as the total number of politically motivated violent incidents reported in
Egyptian newspapers in any one year. We will be fitting a currency substitution model 
incorporating quarterly economic data, so the political violence index we will use is a 
quarterly interpolation of the logarithm of the annual series reported in our primary 
sources.16 This quarterly time series is illustrated in Figure 3.
16 The interpolation method is that of Lisman and Sandee (1964). Alternative filters (such as the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter) produce quarterly series that look very similar to the one we use.9
[Figure 3 here]
Figure 3 shows that the level of violence has varied considerably over the last 20 years. 
In particular, there was a substantial and apparently permanent increase in the level of 
violence in the early 1990s, coinciding approximately with the instigation of the ERSAP. 
Investigating whether the ERSAP was one of the causes of the increase in violence is 
beyond the scope of this paper; but we will investigate whether the violence has
counteracted some of the effects of the reform program. In order to do this we need to 
construct an econometric model of Egyptian currency substitution that incorporates the 
political violence index.
4. The econometric model
4.1 Introduction
In standard models of money demand with adjustment costs (for example, Cuthbertson 
and Taylor, 1987; Agénor and Khan, 1996), the real value of the total stock of financial 
assets – or the ratio of two components of the stock, R – evolves according to a process of 
the form:






 (l·r)j·Et[ln(R*)t+j]} + ut (1)
where R* is the desired ratio, l is an adjustment cost parameter, r a discount rate, u a 
stochastic error and Et[.] an expectations operator. (In our case, there will be four 
different ratios: DB, D P, S B and S P)I fR* is a function of a vector of N political and 
economic variables, zt = [z1t,...,zNt]’, then under Rational Expectations this process can be 
represented by:
Rt = a0 + a1·Rt-1 + a2·p(L)zt + ht (2)
zt+1 = f(L)zt + qt (3)
with certain cross-equation restrictions on the lag polynomials p(L) and f(L). h  and  q are 
random error terms. Estimation of equation (2) alone is consistent but inefficient. Under 
alternative hypotheses about expectations, other restrictions on p(L) are appropriate.10
We will be working with a sample of about 60 observations,17 so tests of
restrictions of this kind will not have very much power. For this reason, we decide to 
remain agnostic about the process by which expectations are formed, and will estimate 
equations of the form of (2) above, but without any restrictions. We acknowledge that 
this involves a potential efficiency loss, but we wish to be sure that we are not imposing 
invalid restrictions leading to inconsistent parameter estimates. In this respect we differ 
from some previous work on foreign currency deposits in LDCs, for example Agénor and 
Khan (1996), who do impose Rational Expectations restrictions. Since the main focus of 
our analysis is the impact of political violence on asset demand, our primary concern is 
to obtain a consistent estimate of the political violence parameter.
The choice of variables to enter the z vector is informed by existing economic 
theory. The desired ratio of foreign to domestic currency deposits will depend on their 
relative rate of return. This relative return comprises the difference between foreign and 
domestic interest rates plus the rate of nominal exchange rate depreciation. (Since Egypt 
has been financially repressed for most of its history, there is no reason to expect any 
sort of interest parity condition to hold.)
Since the numerators and denominators of the asset ratios we are measuring are 
made up of aggregates that are not entirely homogenous, the choice of an appropriate 
interest rate differential is not entirely straightforward. However, all rates offered on 
dollar deposits (which make up the bulk of foreign currency deposits) closely track the 
three-month LIBOR. Typically, the rates offered by Egyptian banks are 30-40 basis
points below the LIBOR, and this margin is pretty constant over time. Similarly, all 
rates on Egyptian pound deposits closely track the three-month domestic deposit rate, 
controlled by the government for most of our sample period. We will use the end-of
quarter difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month deposit rate as 
our interest differential measure, denoted [r* - r]t.
The rate of exchange rate depreciation that investors will take into account
depends on which foreign currency market they have access to. Those with access to the 
black market will operate on the basis of the black market rate; others will operate on 
the basis of the official rate. We do not have reliable information on the fraction of 
investors with access to the black market, so we will include both quarterly depreciation 
in the black market rate (∆ln(bt)) and quarterly depreciation in the official rate (∆ln(st))
separately in our model. So in total we have three variables capturing the relative rate of 
return on foreign currency deposits. These variables are illustrated in Figure 4.
17 The sample size is limited by the availability of data for the dependent variables, which are 
reported from the early 1980s onwards, and for the  political violence index, which runs up to 
1997. Table 5 below indicates the sample sizes in each regression.11
[Figure 4 here]
In time-series models of currency ratios in which the only source of uncertainty is the 
conditional volatility of the relative rate of return, and in which this volatility is constant 
over time, the three variables above are the only ones to appear in the regression 
equations. However, our model will include three variables capturing different kinds of 
uncertainty.
1. It turns out that in Egypt the conditional volatility of the rate of depreciation 
of the black market rate ∆ln(b) is not constant over time. In fact, the process 
for this variable exhibits autoregressive heteroskedasticity (ARCH). Table 1 
reports an ARCH regression for ∆ln(b). When ∆ln(b) is conditioned on its own 
past value, the squared regression residual is  significantly autocorrelated.18
We will include the fitted squared residual (ht) as an explanatory variable in 
the currency substitution equation. We anticipate that higher conditional
volatility will reduce the relative demand for dollar deposits, because the bulk 
of Egyptian consumption is in goods purchased in domestic currency. Higher 
volatility in the exchange rate induces greater uncertainty in the purchasing 
power of dollar deposits. We do not include any analogous volatility indicator 
relating to the official exchange rate ∆ln(s). As can be seen from Figure 4, ln(s)
was constant for most of the sample period, changing only during the
liberalization episode in 1990-91. So the conditional volatility of  ∆ln(s) is
highly correlated with its mean, and has no extra explanatory power in the 
currency substitution equations.
[Table 1 here]
2. As we have already noted, asset ratios are to be estimated over a period in 
which there has been a substantial devaluation / liberalization episode. It is 
quite possible that this episode has altered Egyptians’ perceptions about the 
health of the domestic financial system. Post-liberalization, there may be 
greater confidence that there will be no further devaluations of the domestic 
18 Alternative specifications of the mean equation for ∆ln(b) in Table 1 including more regressors 
– such as the other explanatory variables in the currency substitution model described below –
produce very similar estimates of the magnitude of squared residual autocorrelation. These
regressors are not jointly significant. Note from Table 3 below that ∆ln(b) is a stationary series.12
currency. One measure of the degree of confidence Egyptians can be expected 
to have in their own currency is the gap between the black market and official 
exchange rates, as measure by, for example, ln(b/s), which was substantially 
reduced by the liberalization episode. After the liberalization episode reducing 
ln(b/s), Egyptians may have been more confident that the official value of
domestic currency assets would be maintained. Of course, this does not alter 
the fact that during the episode (when the official exchange rate is
depreciating rapidly) the relative demand for foreign currency deposits ought 
to have been higher. This should be reflected by a positive association between 
the relative demand for foreign currency deposits and the rate of depreciation 
of the official rate, ∆ln(s). In other words, the short-run and long-run impacts 
of the devaluation on the asset ratios are differently signed.
3. Finally, we will include our political instability index, ln(v). Higher instability 
ought to raise the relative demand for foreign currency deposits, for the 
reasons outlined in Section 2.
So our econometric model will incorporate four asset ratios – ln(DB), ln(DP), ln(SB)a n d
ln(SP) – plus the explanatory variables discussed above: [r*-r], ∆ln(s), ln(b/s), ∆ln(b), h
and ln(v). The precise definition and data sources for these variables are listed in
Appendix 2. Table 2 lists sample standard deviations of the variables, which will be 
important in interpreting the regression equation coefficients. The underlying rationale 
for the model is encapsulated by equation (2) above but the econometric specification, 
discussed below, depends on the time-series properties of these variables.
[Table 2 here]
4.2. Model specification
In a small sample such as ours, tests for the order of integration of the variables of 
interest have relatively little power. Indeed, the ADF test statistics reported in Table 3 
for the four asset ratios and the interest rate differential, [r*-r], include some statistics 
quite close to the 10% critical value, so it is not at all obvious whether they should be 
treated as I(0) or I(1). Moreover, one of our explanatory variables, ln(v), is derived from 
an annual series with too few observations to make any formal stationarity test at all 
meaningful. The only variables for which there is strong evidence of stationarity are 
∆ln(b) and ∆ln(s), though h is stationary by construction.  For these reasons, we choose to 
remain agnostic about the order of integration of most of the variables of interest, and 
employ the approach advocated by Pesaran et al. (2001). That is, we specify an equation 13
for each asset ratio R = (DB,D P, SB, SP) that includes contemporaneous growth rates of 
all the variables of an uncertain order of integration (i.e., all variables except  ∆ln(b),
∆ln(s) and h) plus lagged levels.19 Our empirical specification of equation (2) becomes:































 + b*·ln(R)t-1 + g *·ln(b/s)t-1 + z*·[r*-r]t-1 + h*·ln(v)t-1 + q·ht + e
R
t (4)
All Greek letters are parameters; e
R
t is the regression residual. If we do not know that 
the variables in equation (4) are I(0) then we cannot rely on the t-ratios associated with 
the starred parameters. However, Pesaran et al. (2001) calculate upper and lower
bounds for the critical values of an F-test for the joint significance of the starred
parameters, i.e., a test of the absence of a long run relationship between the possibly I(1) 
variables. The upper bound corresponds to the case that all are I(1), the lower to the case 
that they are all I(0).
Since the four regression residuals might be correlated there are potential
efficiency gains from estimating the four equations simultaneously: the OLS and
Maximum Likelihood estimates will not be identical. However, the maximum sample 
period available is not the same for all four asset ratios. So simultaneous estimation 
requires the omission of some observations from some equations, with a consequent
efficiency loss. For this reason we estimate the equations both singly by OLS, using as 
long a sample period as possible, and simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood. As we 
will see, the parameter estimates are very similar for the two estimators.
[Tables 3-5 here]
4.3. Estimation results
The full OLS regression results are reported in Table 5; the corresponding ML estimates 
are available on request. Table 4 reports the long-run coefficients implicit in both the 
OLS and the ML estimates, which are very similar. Table 4 also includes F-statistics for 
the test of the null that there is no long-run relationship between the possibly I(1)
variables. With the exception of the OLS regression for DB, all the F -statistics are 
greater than the upper bound of the corresponding 5% critical value. (For DB the F -
19 Our ∆ln(b) regressions suggest that the black market exchange rate is independent of deposit 
ratios. (Most black market transactions are probably in cash.) However, we did also look at 
deposit ratio regressions that omitted contemporaneous value of ∆ln(b). The long-run parameter 
estimates from these equations were very similar to the ones reported below, which suggests that 
there is no endogeneity bias.14
statistic falls between the upper and lower bounds.) This gives us some confidence that 
the long-run relationships between the possibly I(1) variables in equation (4) are
statistically significant. In all the regressions, the maximum lag order for each variable 
z, Tz, has been chosen to minimize the Schwartz-Bayesian Information Criterion. (In 
some cases Tz = 0.) 
The first part of Table 5 records regression diagnostic statistics: Hansen’s (1992) 
joint test for parameter stability, LM tests for residual autocorrelation and ARCH, and 
χ2 tests for normality of the residual distribution. In no case is there any evidence for 
mis-specification of the regression equations. The following parts of the table record the 
parameters estimated in each of the four regression equations, along with standard 
errors, t-ratios and partial R2s. (In some cases there is some evidence of
heteroskedasticity, so corrected standard errors are also recorded. The difference
between corrected and uncorrected standard errors is typically very small.) 
Individual regression coefficients are difficult to interpret economically, so
Figures 5-8 summarise the regression coefficients by plotting the dynamic response of 
each asset to a permanent standard deviation shock to the level of ln(s), ln(b) and ln(v)
respectively, and to a temporary standard deviation shock to h.20 The plots are
constructed on the assumption that all other variables are held constant, and are
therefore entirely hypothetical. The following economic interpretation of our results
refers to the response profiles in these figures and to the long-run coefficients reported in 
Table 4. We will consider the impact on asset ratios of each variable in turn.
[Figures 5-8 here]
1. The official exchange rate, s. As conjectured above a positive shock to s, i.e., a 
devaluation of the official exchange rate, causes a temporary increase in the ratio 
of foreign to domestic currency deposits: during the devaluation period the
relative rate of return on foreign currency deposits is higher. As long as the black 
market rate b remains constant, there is nonetheless an eventual decrease in the 
ratio: after the devaluation has reduced the black market premium (b/s),
Egyptians have more confidence in their own currency. This is true of all four 
asset ratios, applying equally to the business sector and the personal sector, to 
demand deposits and savings deposits. The response profile is also very similar 
for all four ratios, with a peak in the response profile four quarters on from the 
20 We plot the impact of a temporary shock to h because this variable is definitely stationary, so 
permanent shocks are impossible. The other three explanatory variables are (possibly) difference-
stationary.15
shock. The magnitude of the initial increase is somewhat greater for savings
deposits than for demand deposits. A standard deviation shock to ln(s) will cause 
the savings deposit ratios to increase by about 10% within the year; for demand 
deposits the impact is about half as big. However, there is not such a large 
difference in the asymptotic effects of the shock. The reduction in the savings 
deposits ratio is slightly more than 10% and the reduction in the demand deposit 
ratio slightly less than 10%, but this difference is not statistically significant. In 
all cases the response profile flattens out after about 20 quarters.
2. The black market exchange rate, b. As anticipated, a positive shock to the 
black market rate increases the relative demand for foreign currency deposits. In 
the short run, as the exchange rate is depreciating, this is because the rate of 
return to foreign currency deposits is higher. In the long run the higher relative 
demand reflects the fact that for a given level of the official rate s, a depreciation 
in the black market rate entails a larger premium b/s. In all cases the short-run
effect exceeds the long-run effect, although the shape of the response profile does 
vary a little across different asset ratios. In response to a s tandard deviation 
shock to b, the ratio for business sector demand deposits (DB) will rise by about 
12½% within four quarters, and then fall back gradually over the next 16
quarters to an asymptote about half as high as this. For the other three asset 
ratios the peak is a little lower, and there is hardly any subsequent reduction in 
the black market rate. Also, the asymptote is reached much more quickly. This 
suggests that for most assets, a permanent shock to the level of b matters more 
because of its consequences for the long-run black market premium than because 
of the implicit temporary change in the rate of currency depreciation.
3. The political violence index,  v. This variable has a statistically significant 
impact on all four asset ratios. In the case of the two demand deposit ratios (DB
and DP) a standard deviation shock to the index raises the relative demand for 
dollar assets by about 3½% on impact; this effect increases gradually over the 
next 20 quarters, by which time it has nearly doubled. In other words, an increase 
in violence will lead to an immediate switch away from domestic currency assets 
into foreign currency assets; if the increase turns out to be permanent, then the 
magnitude of asset switching will increase substantially. For the savings deposit 
ratios (SB and SP) the long-run effects are a little smaller, though still significant. 
A standard deviation shock to ln(v) will lead to an eventual increase in SB of 
about 2½% and in SP of about 4%. However, the initial effects of the shock are 
much greater than this: within the first four quarters the ratios will have
increased by 6-7%. It is not immediately apparent why the dynamic responses of 16
demand deposits and savings deposits to an increase in violence should differ in 
this way. Nevertheless, all four asset ratios exhibit the same general long-run
feature: an increase in violence reduces confidence in local currency assets.
4. The conditional volatility of the rate of black market exchange rate
depreciation, h. All of the asset ratios respond in a very similar way to a
temporary shock to h. As anticipated, there is an initial fall in the relative
demand for dollar deposits. The magnitude of the initial effect following a
standard deviation shock varies from about 4% to about 6%, depending on the
asset in question. About half of this effect persists to the end of the fourth
quarter, and by the 20th quarter virtually all of the effect has been dissipated. 
Unpredictability in the black market exchange rate does have some effect in
dissuading businesses and households from holding foreign currency deposits.
5. The interest rate differential, [r*-r]. As can be seen in Figure 4, the interest 
rate differential has exhibited far less variability than the rate of exchange rate 
depreciation in Egypt. For this reason, it is difficult to establish any strong
relationship between asset demand and the differential: there just isn’t enough 
variation in the [r*-r] time series. For the two demand deposit ratios, the
regression Schwartz Criterion is minimized when all  lags of the interest rate 
term are excluded, so the variable does not appear in the first two regressions 
reported in Table 5. For the two savings deposit ratios there is a statistically 
significant relationship, with an elasticity of around 0.05. In the case of SB this is 
only a short-run effect, but in the case of SP the effect is also statistically
significant in the long run. Increases in the differential will encourage a switch 
into foreign currency deposits, but the effect is quite small.
The regression results indicate that political violence is as important as economic factors 
in determining Egyptian investors’ currency substitution decisions. The order of
magnitude of a typical shock to the political violence index is as great as that of a typical
shock to the official or black market exchange rate. In other words, Egyptian government 
policies that affect the level of violence are just as important as exchange rate
management in influencing investors’ decisions.
5. Conclusion
In the early 1990s the Egyptian government undertook a substantial monetary reform 
program that included a liberalization of foreign currency and capital markets: the 
authorities removed financially repressive interest rate controls and eliminated the
black market exchange rate premium. One indicator of the degree of confidence in17
government monetary policy is the fraction of domestic assets that are held in domestic 
currency as opposed to foreign currency. If local investors are confident that the
government will ensure that the Egyptian Pound retains its value against major
international currencies, then they are less likely to hold foreign currency deposits. It is 
therefore noteworthy that at the end of a reasonably successful reform programme the 
share of domestic currency assets in the total is little different from its initial level.
One might just ascribe the lack of a substantial response to cynicism on the part 
of private investors. However, econometric analysis reveals an alternative explanation. 
Investors have responded positively to the monetary reform: other things being equal, 
they will switch into domestic currency assets when the value of the Egyptian Pound is 
stable and there is little or no premium on the black market for foreign exchange.
However, the positive impact of the monetary reform has been offset by an increase in 
politically motivated violent attacks by radical Islamist groups. Investors’ behavior is 
highly sensitive to variations in the degree of violence over time, and the increase in 
violence has offset the effects of the reform programme.
These stylized facts lead to two conclusions. First, reform packages that
concentrate solely on financial and economic factors are unlikely to be effective in
promoting confidence in the local economy if they do not also deal with the causes of 
political conflict in the country concerned (in this case Egypt). Second, increases in
violent conflict increase the demand for foreign currency, and in particular US Dollars, 
while at the same time reducing the demand for local currency. So the local seigniorage 
revenue tax base contracts and the tax base in industrialized countries – and in
particular the US – expands. Given the negative international externalities known to 
result from radical Islamism in countries like Egypt, enlightened self-interest might
direct the industrialized world to channel the extra implicit seigniorage revenue into 
social and economic aid designed to stabilize the Egyptian economy and remove the 
economic sources of political unrest.21
21 It is unlikely that the sources of unrest are entirely economic (Hafez, 2000). But cross-country
evidence indicates that other things being equal, poverty reduction lowers the probability of 
violent conflict (Collier and Hoeffle, 2001). 18
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Appendix 1: The Impact of Political Violence on Tourism Receipts and Foreign 
Exchange Reserves
Tourism receipts and foreign exchange rate reserve data are available only annually in 
Egypt, so statistical analysis of the data is subject to large standard errors.
Nevertheless, using annual data for 1976-97, it is possible to estimate a regression of the 
form:
∆ln(A)t = a·∆ln(v)t + b·ln(v)t-1 - g ·ln(A)t-1 + ut        (A1)
where A is the detrended real dollar value of tourism receipts and v is the political 
violence index discussed in the main text, also detrended.  ut is a residual. The point 
estimate of b/ g  is –0.118, which suggests that in the long run violence reduces receipts; 
but with only 22 observations this figure is not statistically significant.
Similarly, one can estimate the impact of tourism receipts on the central banks’ 
foreign exchange reserves by estimating a regression of the form:
∆ln(F)t = a1·∆ln(A)t + a2·∆ln(A)t-1 + b·ln(A)t-1 + d·∆ln(F)t-1 - g ·ln(F)t-1 + ut           (A2)
where F represents real detrended foreign exchange reserves. (The extra lag is necessary 
to ensure that the residual is not autocorrelated.) Here the estimate of b/ g   is 0.533, and 
this is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. There is a significant correlation 
between Egypt’s tourism receipts and its central bank’s foreign asset position.21
Appendix 2: Definition of and Sources of the Quarterly Data for the Variables
in the Model
ln(DB) The (log) ratio of business sector foreign currency demand deposits to 
business sector domestic currency demand deposits, from the Central
Bank of Egypt (1980-2001)
ln(DP) The (log) ratio of household sector foreign currency demand deposits to 
household sector domestic currency demand deposits, from the Central
Bank of Egypt (1980-2001)
ln(SB) The (log) ratio of business sector foreign currency savings deposits to 
business sector domestic currency savings deposits, from the Central Bank 
of Egypt (1980-2001)
ln(SP) The (log) ratio of household sector foreign currency savings deposits to 
household sector domestic currency savings deposits, from the Central
Bank of Egypt (1980-2001)
[r*-r] The difference between the three-month LIBOR and the Egyptian three-
month deposit rate, from the Central Bank of Egypt (1980-2001)
ln(s) The (log) official Egyptian Pound – US Dollar exchange rate, from IMF 
International Financial Statistics
ln(b) The (log) black market Egyptian Pound – US Dollar exchange rate, from 
Picks Currency Yearbook
ln(v) The (log) number of violent political incidents, interpolated from annual 
figures in Abul`ala (1998) and Hafez (2000)
h The conditional volatility of ∆ln(b); see Table 222
Table 1: ARCH regression: D Dln(b)t = a0 + a1·t + Siai·D Dln(b)t-i + ut
1. Mean Equation: ∆ln(b)
variable   coeff.       std. err.      t ratio        prob.
intercept  0.05195        0.00730        7.113        0.0000
trend/100 -0.08092        0.01604 -5.046        0.0000
∆ln(b)-1 -0.16861        0.07314 -2.305        0.0247
∆ln(b)-2 -0.09603        0.05041 -1.905        0.0618
2. Variance Equation: u2
variable   coeff.       std. err.      t ratio        prob.
intercept/100  0.04758        0.02010        2.367        0.0213
u2
-1  2.90750        0.99239        2.930        0.0048
Table 2: Standard Deviations of Variables’ Growth Rates: 82(3)-96(4)
 ln(DB) = 0.163     ln(SP) = 0.179     ln(s) = 0.112     ln(b) = 0.068
ln(DP) = 0.109     ln(SB) = 0.191    [r*-r] = 0.933%    ln(v) = 0.313
Table 3: Stationarity Test Statistics
variable ADF t ratio   5% critical value  lag order  trend
ln(DB) -1.685 -2.898            0 no
ln(DP) -1.338 -2.898            0 no
ln(SB) -2.361 -3.474            2 yes
ln(SP) -2.229 -3.474            2 yes
[r*-r] -2.104 -2.897  0 no
ln(b/s) -1.649 -2.909 4 no
∆ln(b) -4.995 -3.482        4 yes
Lag orders and deterministic components of the ADF regressions are selected 
on the basis of the Schwartz Criterion.
Table 4: Long-Run Coefficients
Equation ln(b/s) ln(v) [r*-r] F-statistic h x 100
∆ln(DB) OLS 0.8448 0.1926 0.0000 F(3,47) = 03.7 -0.1149
∆ln(DP) OLS 0.8217 0.1961 0.0000 F(3,48) = 08.2 -0.0708
∆ln(SB) OLS 1.1624 0.0567 0.0000 F(3,36) = 22.3 -0.0462
∆ln(SP) OLS 1.1050 0.1294 0.0666 F(4,37) = 20.9 -0.0822
∆ln(DB) FIML 0.9780 0.1653 0.0000 F(3,44) = 07.4 -0.1158
∆ln(DP) FIML 0.9014 0.1981 0.0000 F(3,39) = 13.7 -0.0710
∆ln(SB) FIML 1.1466 0.0558 0.0000 F(3,36) = 32.4 -0.0510
∆ln(SP) FIML 1.1128 0.0923 0.0448 F(4,37) = 29.7 -0.078823
Table 5: OLS Regression Results
“h.c.s.e” indicates standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
“ins.” indicates Hansen’s (1992) parameter stability statistic.
1. Diagnostic Statistics










∆ln(DB) 2.25705 0.2528 0.9867 0.2542
∆ln(DP) 2.66631 0.4322 0.5551 0.9584
∆ln(SB) 2.47979 0.2144 0.5742 0.1392
∆ln(SP) 2.63491 0.3379 0.8474 0.4566
2. ∆ln(DB) equation. Sample: 1981(3)-1996(4)
variable coeff. s.e. t ratio h.c.s.e. ptl. R2 ins.
intercept -0.37485 0.11210 -3.344 0.12750 0.1922 0.07
∆ln(DB)-1 -0.18697 0.13273 -1.409 0.11329 0.0405 0.09
∆ln(s)  0.26264 0.21569  1.218 0.15936 0.0306 0.05
∆ln(s)-1  0.28555 0.24644  1.159 0.15787 0.0278 0.02
∆ln(s)-2  0.24348 0.22513  1.082 0.27953 0.0243 0.03
∆ln(s)-3  0.43412 0.21324  2.036 0.14086 0.0810 0.01
∆ln(b)  0.54163 0.34127  1.587 0.32583 0.0509 0.20
∆ln(b)-1  0.54946 0.38061  1.444 0.28819 0.0425 0.12
∆ln(b)-2  0.68221 0.37951  1.798 0.44932 0.0643 0.20
∆ln(b)-3  0.58054 0.34438  1.686 0.28248 0.0570 0.09
∆ln(v)  0.12290 0.06511  1.888 0.08021 0.0705 0.36
ln(DB)-1 -0.19932 0.06879 -2.898 0.07506 0.1516 0.12
ln(b/s)-1  0.16838 0.06107  2.757 0.06262 0.1392 0.03
ln(v)-1  0.03838 0.01786  2.149 0.01718 0.0895 0.11
h -2.29060 0.89899 -2.548 0.77276 0.1214 0.04
R2 = 0.38624; Joint significance: F(14,47) = 2.1126; σ = 0.14826
3. ∆ln(DP) equation. Sample: 1981(3)-1996(4)
variable coeff. s.e. t ratio h.c.s.e. ptl. R2 ins.
intercept -0.37830 0.08553 -4.423 0.09173 0.2895 0.04
∆ln(DP)-1 -0.19692 0.11161 -1.764 0.12127 0.0609 0.19
∆ln(s)  0.19388 0.13696  1.416 0.11927 0.0401 0.02
∆ln(s)-1  0.26715 0.15169  1.761 0.09891 0.0607 0.03
∆ln(s)-2  0.41208 0.13580  3.034 0.13505 0.1610 0.02
∆ln(s)-3  0.31926 0.13133  2.431 0.07422 0.1096 0.01
∆ln(b)  0.25065 0.20254  1.238 0.19845 0.0309 0.08
∆ln(b)-1 -0.10418 0.21801 -0.478 0.17857 0.0047 0.18
∆ln(b)-2  0.67092 0.21570  3.110 0.23655 0.1677 0.05
∆ln(v)  0.11340 0.03907  2.902 0.04638 0.1493 0.36
ln(DP)-1 -0.21199 0.05713 -3.711 0.06456 0.2229 0.06
ln(b/s)-1  0.17419 0.03742  4.655 0.04287 0.3110 0.03
ln(v)-1  0.04158 0.01220  3.409 0.01221 0.1949 0.04
h -1.50080 0.51751 -2.900 0.44484 0.1491 0.39
R2 = 0.49617; Joint significance: F(13,48) = 3.6362; σ = 0.0887224
Table 5 (Continued)
4. ∆ln(SB) equation. Sample: 1983(2)-1996(4)
variable coeff. s.e. t ratio h.c.s.e. ptl. R2 ins.
intercept -0.26163 0.05053 -5.177 0.04707 0.4268 0.04
∆ln(SB)-1  0.12861 0.07945  1.619 0.07695 0.0678 0.11
∆ln(s)  0.29270 0.14419  2.030 0.09203 0.1027 0.03
∆ln(s)-1  0.97091 0.17202  5.644 0.15277 0.4695 0.02
∆ln(s)-2  1.08240 0.16158  6.699 0.19309 0.5549 0.02
∆ln(s)-3  0.55007 0.14893  3.693 0.10244 0.2748 0.02
∆ln(b) -0.26378 0.22798 -1.157 0.18038 0.0359 0.06
∆ln(b)-1 -0.32341 0.22595 -1.431 0.24129 0.0538 0.08
∆ln(b)-2  0.75333 0.22547  3.341 0.29291 0.2367 0.03
∆[r*-r] -0.00711 0.01823 -0.390 0.01359 0.0042 0.07
∆[r*-r]-1   0.04193 0.01858  2.257 0.01845 0.1240 0.02
∆[r*-r]-2   0.02972 0.01882  1.580 0.01655 0.0648 0.08
∆ln(v)  0.27901 0.10812  2.580 0.11774 0.1561 0.03
∆ln(v)-1  -0.21842 0.15975 -1.367 0.13240 0.0494 0.08
∆ln(v)-2   0.27095 0.11290  2.400 0.10638 0.1379 0.26
ln(SB)-1 -0.41213 0.05298 -7.780 0.06784 0.6270 0.03
ln(b/s)-1  0.47905 0.06254  7.659 0.07316 0.6197 0.01
ln(v)-1  0.02336 0.01066  2.191 0.00950 0.1177 0.05
h -1.90370 0.59010 -3.226 0.67451 0.2243 0.15
R2 = 0.77717; Joint significance: F(18,36) = 6.9755; σ = 0.08717
5. ∆ln(SP) equation. Sample: 1983(2)-1996(4)
variable coeff. s.e. t ratio h.c.s.e. ptl. R2 ins.
intercept -0.37144 0.05182 -7.168 0.06524 0.5814 0.05
∆ln(SP)-1 -0.09665 0.07091 -1.363 0.11161 0.0478 0.09
∆ln(s)  0.49512 0.10578  4.681 0.07420 0.3719 0.05
∆ln(s)-1  0.70950 0.13602  5.216 0.14464 0.4237 0.02
∆ln(s)-2  0.66128 0.11684  5.660 0.13688 0.4640 0.01
∆ln(s)-3  0.27886 0.10767  2.590 0.10614 0.1535 0.05
∆ln(b) -0.07835 0.16207 -0.483 0.16289 0.0063 0.18
∆ln(b)-1 -0.18510 0.17971 -1.030 0.18965 0.0279 0.08
∆ln(b)-2  0.75378 0.17929  4.204 0.26178 0.3233 0.03
∆ln(b)-3   0.41891 0.17053  2.457 0.19070 0.1402 0.03
∆[r*-r]  0.01823 0.01443  1.263 0.01545 0.0414 0.19
∆[r*-r]-1   0.02158 0.01464  1.474 0.01117 0.0555 0.05
∆ln(v)  0.20432 0.04130  4.948 0.05785 0.3982 0.03
ln(SP)-1 -0.28770 0.03786 -7.598 0.05248 0.6094 0.06
ln(b/s)-1  0.31791 0.04262  7.459 0.05387 0.6006 0.03
[r*-r]  0.01917 0.00941  2.036 0.00854 0.1007 0.03
ln(v)-1  0.03722 0.01318  2.824 0.01447 0.1773 0.04
h -2.36430 0.40853 -5.787 0.54995 0.4751 0.15
R2 = 0.82033; Joint significance: F(17,37) = 9.9372; σ = 0.0662725
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response  t o  l n(s)






response  t o  l n(b)




response  t o  l n(v)
0 5 10 15 20
- . 04
- . 02
0 response  t o  h
Fi gure 7:   I m pul se Responses:   ∆l n(S
B)   Equat i on





response  t o  l n(s)






response  t o  l n(b)





. 065 response  t o  l n(v)




0 response  t o  h
Fi gure 8:   I m pul se Responses:   ∆l n(S
P)   Equat i on